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Chrome Blocks Fake HTTPS Certificates After Hackers Hijack Country Domains

Chrome Blocks Fake HTTPS Certificates After Hackers Hijack Country Domains

Chrome blocked unauthorized HTTPS certificates after attackers hijacked .gh.sl, and .as domain registries. Here is what Chrome users need to know.
Last updated
October 7, 2026
7 min read
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Photo: TechJournal

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Quick Answer

Chrome blocked unauthorized HTTPS certificates after attackers compromised registries for the .gh.sl, and .as country-code domains, Google said on October 6, 2026. The incident could have helped attackers impersonate affected websites. Chrome users do not need to take action for the Google certificates Google identified, but users of other browsers and apps should keep software updated and treat unexpected login prompts carefully.

Key Takeaways

  • Attackers compromised third-party registries for .gh.sl, and .as domains.
  • The attackers changed authoritative DNS records and obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates.
  • Google said its own systems were not breached during the incident.
  • Chrome blocked identified certificates through its CRLSet revocation system.
  • Google warned that browser-side protections do not cover every user or non-Chrome client.

What happened with the fake HTTPS certificates?

Attackers obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates after compromising third-party registries for the .gh.sl, and .as country-code domains. Google disclosed the incident on October 6, 2026, and said the attackers modified authoritative DNS records for several Google domains and domains belonging to other organizations. Google’s security disclosure states that Google’s own systems were not breached.

The unauthorized certificates matter because HTTPS certificates help browsers confirm that a website controls the domain a user intended to visit. A fraudulent certificate can make an attacker-controlled site appear valid to software that does not know the certificate has been revoked. The practical risk is not limited to a misleading web page, because a trusted-looking connection can make phishing, credential theft, or traffic interception harder for a user to detect.

Google said Certificate Transparency data indicated that other leading global brands and widely used online services were likely affected, although Google did not name those organizations. Users should therefore avoid assuming that a browser padlock alone proves a login page is safe, particularly after following a link in an unexpected email, message, or advertisement. Similar impersonation risks also explain why users should be cautious about browser-based fake support alerts that attempt to turn a normal security concern into an urgent request for access or payment.

How did the domain registry compromise enable certificate issuance?

The domain registry compromise enabled certificate issuance because attackers controlled DNS records used in automated domain-control validation. Certificate authorities use domain-control validation to verify that a certificate requester controls the domain named in the certificate. Control of the authoritative DNS records allowed the attackers to pass that validation process without legitimately controlling the affected organization’s systems.

Independent technical reporting explains that the altered DNS records let attackers satisfy the automated checks certificate authorities rely on before issuing certificates. This distinction is important: the incident did not require a breach of Google’s internal network to create a convincing certificate problem. Control over a registry-level DNS setting was enough to influence a separate trust process.

Authoritative DNS is the source of record that tells the internet where a domain’s services are located and which records belong to that domain. When an attacker changes those records, services that trust DNS-based validation can receive false confirmation. The sensible response for organizations is to review registry account controls, limit who can modify DNS, and monitor certificate issuance for domains they manage.

Incident componentWhat attackers changed or obtainedWhy it matters
Country-code registriesAccess to registries for .gh.sl, and .asRegistry access can affect authoritative DNS records.
Authoritative DNSModified records for affected domainsAltered DNS can pass domain-control validation.
HTTPS certificatesUnauthorized certificates for Google and other domainsCertificates can make a fraudulent service look authenticated.
Chrome protectionCertificate blocking through CRLSetsChrome can reject identified revoked certificates.

Did Chrome protect users from the unauthorized certificates?

Chrome blocked the unauthorized certificates Google identified by using CRLSets, Google said. CRLSets are Chrome’s certificate revocation mechanism, which lets the browser recognize certificates that should no longer be trusted. Google also worked with issuing certificate authorities to revoke certificates associated with Google properties.

Chrome protection reduces the immediate risk for users who browse affected Google domains in Chrome because the browser can reject certificates added to its revocation data. Google said Chrome users do not need to take action for the identified certificates. That conclusion applies to the specific certificates Google identified, not to every possible certificate or every type of software that might connect to an affected service.

Google specifically cautioned that browser-side intervention cannot be relied on to protect all users or non-Chrome clients. The limitation matters for people using other browsers, older devices, standalone apps, embedded web views, or software that handles certificates differently. Keep browsers and operating systems updated, and avoid entering passwords after reaching a website through an unfamiliar link. Users who receive suspicious security prompts should also be alert to account-compromise tactics such as unauthorized exposure of account data, which can create convincing follow-up phishing attempts.

Which certificates were issued during the incident?

Certificates for Google and YouTube were issued during the incident and have since been revoked, according to a Let’s Encrypt staff member. The confirmation establishes that the incident produced real certificates rather than only an attempted registry compromise. Let’s Encrypt’s community support post confirms the issuance and later revocation.

Certificate Transparency records provide a public record of issued certificates, which helps researchers and domain owners detect unexpected issuance. The Hacker News identified at least 12 certificates for Google and YouTube names in affected country-code domains, issued between September 22 and September 27. Its review found that 11 certificates came from Let’s Encrypt and 1 came from ZeroSSL.

The certificate count helps show the scope of the publicly visible activity, but it does not establish every service that may have been targeted or every connection that may have been affected. Certificate Transparency data can reveal certificates after issuance, yet it does not prove that each certificate was used in an active attack. Organizations should treat unexpected certificate records as a security signal that requires investigation, revocation checks, and DNS review.

What should Chrome users do now?

Chrome users should keep Chrome updated and continue using normal phishing precautions, because Google said Chrome already blocked the identified unauthorized certificates. Updating matters because browser security protections, certificate revocation data, and other defenses depend on current software. Users do not need to reinstall Chrome or change Google passwords solely because of Google’s identified certificates.

Users should verify the destination before entering a password, particularly when a message asks them to sign in again, confirm a payment method, or download a file. A legitimate-looking HTTPS connection remains useful, but the registry incident shows why the padlock is only one security signal. Type important web addresses directly, use saved bookmarks, and enable multi-factor authentication on accounts that support it.

  1. Update Chrome through Chrome menu > Help > About Google Chrome.
  2. Open important services from a saved bookmark or by typing the address directly.
  3. Review unexpected account-security messages through the provider’s official site, not through the message link.
  4. Change a password and end active sessions if you entered credentials on a suspicious page.
  5. Contact the affected service’s support team if an account shows unfamiliar activity or recovery details.

Account recovery is the appropriate stop line if a user sees unfamiliar sign-ins, changed recovery information, or unauthorized purchases. Do not install remote-access tools or call a phone number from a pop-up warning. That type of pressure tactic is separate from the certificate incident, but it remains a common way attackers exploit security anxiety.

Why are non-Chrome browsers and apps a concern?

Non-Chrome browsers and apps remain a concern because Google said browser-side intervention cannot be relied on to protect all users or non-Chrome clients. Chrome’s CRLSet blocking applies to Chrome’s handling of the identified certificates. Other software may use different certificate stores, revocation methods, update schedules, or network configurations.

The limitation does not mean every non-Chrome browser or app is unsafe. It means users should not assume Chrome’s announced protection automatically extends to all software on a phone, computer, or managed work device. The safest general action is to install operating system and application updates promptly, especially on devices that handle work accounts, financial services, or sensitive personal data.

Organizations should also consider whether internal apps, mobile device management tools, or network appliances validate certificates differently from mainstream browsers. Security teams need to review certificate and DNS monitoring rather than relying only on browser protections. People who use public Wi-Fi should avoid handling sensitive account changes through unfamiliar apps until the app and device are fully updated.

How can organizations reduce risks from fake HTTPS certificates?

Organizations can reduce fake HTTPS certificate risks by protecting registry and DNS administration accounts, monitoring Certificate Transparency logs, and responding quickly to unexpected certificate issuance. The incident shows that DNS and registry access are part of an organization’s security boundary, even when the organization’s own servers and identity systems have not been breached.

Registry accounts should use strong authentication and tightly limited administrative access. DNS changes should be logged, reviewed, and restricted to authorized staff because an unauthorized record can affect services beyond a company website. Certificate monitoring is also useful because an unexpected certificate can reveal a validation problem before users report a suspicious login page.

Organizations should prepare a response plan that includes certificate authority contact details, DNS rollback procedures, browser and customer communications, and support guidance for users. The goal is to shorten the period during which an unauthorized certificate can be useful. Security teams should also explain incidents clearly to customers, as vague alerts can make users more vulnerable to phishing messages that imitate a legitimate security notice.

Consumers who manage websites or small business domains should use the same basic principle: protect the registrar account as carefully as the website account. A compromised domain account can create broader trust problems than a single altered webpage, particularly when email, login pages, and DNS validation all depend on the same domain.

FAQ

Did hackers breach Google’s systems?

No, Google said its own systems were not breached. The attackers compromised third-party registries for the .gh.sl, and .as country-code domains and changed authoritative DNS records.

Should Chrome users change their Google passwords?

No, Chrome users do not need to change Google passwords solely because of the identified certificates. Google said Chrome blocked those certificates, but users should change passwords if they entered credentials on a suspicious site or see unfamiliar account activity.

What are fake HTTPS certificates?

Fake HTTPS certificates are unauthorized certificates that can make an attacker-controlled service appear to belong to a legitimate domain. The certificates can be dangerous because software may treat the connection as authenticated until the certificate is revoked or blocked.

Were the Google and YouTube certificates revoked?

Yes, certificates for Google and YouTube issued during the incident were revoked. Let’s Encrypt confirmed that certificates issued during the incident had since been revoked.

Can a browser padlock guarantee that a website is safe?

No, a browser padlock does not guarantee that a website is safe. HTTPS still protects normal connections, but users should verify the web address and avoid entering credentials after following unexpected links.

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Written by
Priya Sharma is a cybersecurity analyst and tech writer who covers digital privacy, online safety, and creative technology tools. She holds a CompTIA Security+ certification and writes about making security accessible for non-technical audiences. She’s passionate about the intersection of AI and creative work.

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